Leona Alleslev, MP and chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, and Elizabeth Kingston, Clerk of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence, suggested that, with the committee looking at Canadian involvement in NATO in the fall session, it would be useful to have some prescriptive policy advice.cruited CGAI fellows – scholars, former diplomats, military officers and senior officials – many of who were at the symposium. These included Andrea Charron, Richard Cohen, Rolf Holmboe, Andrew Rasiulis and myself – as well as more distant fellows – CGAI Director of Programming, David Bercuson, member of the CGAI Advisory Council, Ian Brodie, Yves Brodeur, Julian Lindley-French and Lindsay Rodman. We also included a pertinent essay by graduate scholar Ariel Shapiro. Thus, this volume of essays took shape.

The Olsen book, which brought us together and started this exercise, was an initiative of the Ministry of Defence to strengthen American and British interest in the north, to promote the geostrategic and security policy significance of the Norwegian seas, and to discuss how best to secure open supply lines and sea control within NATO’s area of responsibility. In his concluding remarks, Col. Olsen summed up the book’s six key recommendations:

1. Renew NATO’s maritime strategy.
2. Reintroduce extensive maritime exercises and sustained presence.
3. Reform NATO’s command structure.
4. Invest in maritime capabilities and situational awareness.
5. Enhance maritime partnerships.
6. Prepare for maritime hybrid warfare.

Our participants approached Canadian involvement in NATO from various perspectives and each essay offers both analysis and prescription. Their papers look at the challenges of overall organization, those of budget, the vital importance played by the USA and the need for the rest of the alliance to burden-share. We address the challenges to NATO’s northern, eastern and southern flanks, as well as the continuing challenges in Afghanistan. And we re-examine the utility of NATO.

David Bercuson is optimistic about NATO, but if NATO is a “bridge among continents and nations”, then the United States is its “central span”. Bercuson observes that because NATO was ratified by the U.S. Senate, it would require Senate approval to pull the U.S. out of it.

Bercuson writes that Donald Trump is wrong in many things, but he is right to argue for more burden sharing by NATO members. He encourages NATO allies to read up on U.S. history to appreciate the strong isolationist strain within the U.S. body politic warning that “another Donald Trump may well lie somewhere else in America’s future.”

Dr. Julian Lindley-French looks at the Wales Summit (2014) defence investment pledge whereby members all agreed to reach the defence spending target of two per cent of GDP. While the increase in allied spending is encouraging, he notes it has a long way to go and that NATO pledges are thin reeds. They tend to bend with the prevailing winds and fall back on the U.S. But “the Bank of Mom and Dad” (as Lindley-French calls the U.S.) is getting fed up with the perennial backsliding of the “Euro-Juniors”, is not as flush as it once was and is now confronting a resurgent China. There is also division within Europe, with some wanting any new money for security spent on domestic counter-terrorism and migrant control rather than on “hard” NATO requirements.

If NATO is to be effective, argues Lindley-French, it “must be able to both deter and defend at the high end of conflict, i.e., prepare to fight and if need be win a war, while playing a full role in protecting its home base from penetration and attack by terrorists and globally capable criminals.”

Canada, says Lindley-French “lives in strategically relevant neighbourhoods in which others have a profound interest, and some of these ‘others’ are not always friendly.” This has particular relevance for the Royal Canadian Navy and the RCAF in their protection of North Atlantic sea lanes, the Arctic and new challenges from the Pacific side. Lindley-French says Canada can do its bit and truly invest in hard defence as well as sustain its soft power skills in stabilization and reconstruction. Or it can follow the usual European approach of pretence and empty rhetoric.

Yves Brodeur reflects on his NATO experience as an official of the NATO Secretariat, as the senior official for Canada’s Afghan participation and, most recently, as Canada’s ambassador to NATO. For Brodeur “if the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact threw NATO in soul-searching mode, September 11 catapulted the Alliance in a new dimension, much more complex and challenging than what it was created, prepared and trained for” and now “the aggressive actions of Russia, annexing Crimea, destabilizing Ukraine and threatening the eastern flank of NATO seriously tested the resolve and solidarity of the Alliance.”

Today, writes Brodeur, the challenges are compounded: “an aggressive Russia, an assertive China, a chaotic Middle East, a North Africa in disarray, an indecisive and divided EU, intense migratory pressures, expanding terrorism, growing authoritarianism including in some NATO nations, the unforeseen strategic consequences of climate change, and an isolationist America led by an unpredictable president.”

Brodeur offers a range of prescriptive improvements: streamlining NATO decision-making with improved managerial capability; avoiding narrow politicization; improving strategic oversight versus regionalization and Eurocentrism; clear commitments to Article 5; as well as gender diversity. Brodeur concludes that both Canada and NATO need to “take a hard look at (themselves) through the prism of a changing and more complex security environment than existed in 1947.”

Ian Brodie writes that the end of the Cold War brought many dividends: democracy and free market economics have become the norm in many former Soviet satellites and millions have been lifted out of grinding poverty. But, he writes, “it is now obvious that NATO has a continuing mission … deterring Russian adventurism today is almost as important as deterring Soviet adventurism was a generation ago.”

The nature of the challenge has changed, says Brodie, and defending western democracies against new modes of aggression requires new strategies and doctrines. The West’s economic model was vastly superior to that of the Soviet bloc but the assumption that the global economy “dissolves authoritarian politics” was overly optimistic. 

Illiberal regimes, writes Brodie, use their access to the global economy to subvert the democracies. They exploit weaknesses in international trade agreements to expand their state-connected economic enterprises overseas. He notes that Russian gas exports to Europe are now “part and parcel” of the economic integration shaping NATO countries’ domestic policies. Brodie concludes with a warning: “New global political economy has made it harder to muster the political will to implement and enforce them.”

In my essay, I argue that the most useful role that Canada can play in sustaining the international order is to keep Donald Trump’s America engaged in NATO. We need to tell Americans that they are our most important ally, and that we do not take them for granted. First, they need to know that we will shoulder our share of the security burden. Second, commitment means taking a greater share of the political burden. Third, commitment means demonstrating a greater interest in U.S. security concerns including those out of theatre. A vital piece is explaining to our public why NATO, collective security and the rule-based international order matter.

So does geography.

Looking North, Andrea Charron says that the recent Defence Policy Review is potentially a shift away from Canada’s former position of eschewing NATO exercises in the Arctic. Charron thinks, given tensions, we should be wary about NATO exercises when we can accomplish the same goal – readiness without the NATO mantle. Charron notes that five of the eight Arctic states¹ are NATO members and so exercises in the European Arctic involving NATO states are not new. The eight Arctic states (including Russia) have formed an Arctic Coast Guard Forum and recently completed their first live exercise in Reykjavik, Iceland.

Charron encourages a reinvigoration of the Arctic Chiefs of Defence meetings starting with military support for search-and-rescue. She also argues that all Arctic nations can benefit from better information sharing to have a more complete understanding of the climate, the geography and the vessels of interest in the Arctic Ocean.

Andrew Rasiulis looks at Canada’s contribution to NATO’s eastern flank defences. He points to Canadian leadership of the battalion-sized battle group in Latvia, (Operation REASSURANCE) as part of NATO’s enhanced forward presence to deter Russian use of force against NATO territory (Article 5 commitment). Canada is making available a six-pack of CF-18 fighter jets and its NATO out-of-area training and capacity-building mission in Ukraine. These initiatives have “placed Canada’s commitment squarely on the politico-military map.”

Rasiulis reviews Canada’s participation in NATO since its origins, noting in particular its push for Article 2 (economic partnership) during the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Washington (1949) and then the development of a Canadian expeditionary capacity for Europe and Korea. He notes that when former prime minister Pierre Trudeau wanted to increase European trade as a counterweight to the U.S. while musing about drawing down Canada’s NATO contribution, then-chancellor Helmut Schmidt observed “no tanks, no trade”. In looking at today’s reinvolvement, Rasiulis argues “efforts in Latvia and Ukraine should be matched by active diplomacy to achieve an eventual understanding with Russia and return to future co-operation, rather than confrontation.”

Richard Cohen points to the alarming increase in Russian military activities on NATO’s northern and eastern flanks, saying the way to demonstrate Canada’s commitment to this collective security challenge is through meeting the two per cent GDP target for defence spending.

Cohen writes that most Western armed forces have remained focused on counter-insurgency and asymmetric warfare of the kind NATO faced in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Russians have rebuilt their forces for high intensity combat, as they demonstrated in Eastern Ukraine. Canada’s recently announced defence policy, says Cohen, provides for relatively tiny contingency forces modelled on Afghanistan’s operational requirements, but inadequate for a heavy combat scenario in Europe. 

Cohen says “we have entered a new kind of Cold War, this time with an array of dangerous adversaries, from an aggressive, resurgent Russia and a rising, assertive China to relatively weak but dangerous rogue states like Iran and North Korea.” All of this makes the case for a greater Canadian contribution to collective defence.

Rolf Holmboe looks at NATO’s southern flank arguing that NATO must engage to contain Russian and Iranian anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) and to block Russian attempts to establish an “axis of autocracies” in the region. NATO needs to enhance Defence Capacity Building (DCB) and expanded military cooperation, including enhanced air and maritime assets within the Middle East and North Africa.

Migration pressures, says Holmboe, are another pressure point and NATO needs to put more into crisis management readiness - intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to counter human smuggling networks and establish a dialogue with its southern flank neighbours around migration control, maritime security and counter-terrorism.

A “hands-off” approach won't work, concludes Holmboe. NATO, in tandem with the EU must address the challenges of its southern flank if it is to contain Russia, curb terrorism and address migratory pressures.

Lindsay Rodman looks at Afghanistan and the NATO role there, observing that with Trump’s decision to maintain the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, there is a role for Canada. But Canada needs to ask some tough questions:

• First, seeking clarity and forcing a good articulation of U.S. and NATO objectives in the region.
• Second, both the United States and NATO must think carefully about how to approach Pakistan.  
• Third, there can be no success in Afghanistan without a political solution and a sustainable path to Afghan self-sufficiency.
• Fourth, NATO partners may seek some clarity and assurances about the use of private contractors in Afghanistan.
• Fifth, NATO should offer up a deal to rename and rebrand the mission.  Even the name “Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT” implies lack of ownership and the never-ending commitment that has plagued this conflict from the outset.

Ariel Shapiro has written a longer piece entitled NATO If Necessary, But Not Necessarily NATO: Critically Evaluating Canada’s Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Shapiro argues that the costs of NATO membership are “higher than often realized” while the benefits “are not as significant as the common wisdom accepts.” He also maintains that NATO membership is “potentially hurting Canada’s Arctic claims and interests, and dragging Canada into a conflict it does not need.”

While not passing judgment on Canada’s NATO membership, Shapiro concludes: “Treating our membership in a military alliance as an end with intrinsic worth, a grand symbol of Canadian identity, as opposed to a means to further Canada’s values and interests, is a mistake … There is a threshold beyond which NATO is too costly, too risky and not beneficial enough to justify continued Canadian membership. It is incumbent upon us to continuously ask ourselves whether or not we have reached that threshold.” Shapiro’s arguments encourage debate and discussion. They are a reminder of the importance of public argument and the need for public affairs on critical security issues.

Canada played a critical role in NATO’s creation. In his memoirs, Lester B. Pearson entitled the chapter on Canada’s critical role in NATO’s creation “Atlantic Vision”. He and his colleagues – Hume Wrong, Norman Robertson and Escott Reid – put effort into NATO’s creation because it served Canadian interests and values. Article 2, encouraging economic collaboration among its members, was very much a Canadian initiative. With the implementation of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), we continue to realize the promise of the Atlantic community.

Preserving the peace and deterring aggression during the Cold War, NATO
managed the reunification of Germany and the integration into NATO of the eastern European nations and those of the former Yugoslavia. The original 12 have expanded to 29, with continuing active engagement both within and out of theatre.

The Trudeau government’s recent Defence Policy Review, ‘Strong, Secure, Engaged’, declares that the NATO alliance has been a central pillar of Euro-Atlantic defence and a cornerstone of Canadian defence and security policy ever since. NATO provides significant benefits to Canada’s security and its global interests and NATO membership also carries important obligations.

We hope that these essays will stimulate discussion and provoke debate about Canada’s involvement in NATO and how best we can carry out our obligations within this fundamentally important alliance.

Colin Robertson
September 2017

End Note
1 Finland, Russia and Sweden are not NATO members.

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